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The final conclusion which arises from this quagmire is that
perhaps the Court acted unintentionally in omitting public discussion
of its decisional process. Perhaps it saw no relevance in discussing
the pre-decision logical step of resolving the conflict of Thompson
and the incorporation doctrine. Perhaps it deemed inconsequential
that its decision tacitly held that jury size is irrelevent to the jury's
role. The truth of these assumptions would make one pause to
contemplate the Court's capacity to act as a safe repository for constitutional rights in this era of problems so complex, so equitably
balanced, so shrouded in uncertainty as to produce conflict among
all aspects of American life.
Conversely, were the Court cognizant of these decisional facets
while avoiding discussing either of them or the motivation of decongesting the courts, then the opinion was less than candid. A
full and open discussion, and a clear understanding, of the problem
is essential to a constitutional decision. Williams evinces a lack of
one, if not both, of these factors in allowing six-man juries based on the
rationale stated in the Court's opinion.
William L. Stevens

CoRPoRAlroNs-SEcumrrEs ExCHANGE ACr of 1934 § 16(b)-"SAiz"
DEvFmD.-A corporate insider1 granted an option on stock which he
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

future when the Court is again faced with conflicts within an "incorporated" area.
See 90 S.Ct. at 1921-22 (Harlan, J.,dissenting). Contra, id. at 1909 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Whatever the future may hold, in Williams the Court chose dilution.
1
Defendant was an insider by virtue of his ownership of over ten per cent of
the outstanding stock of the Cudahy Company. Such insiders are subject to the
provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, set out below:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him
from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer (other than exempted security) within any period
of less than six months unless such security was acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such
beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold
for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be con(Continued on next page)
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and his wife had purchased less than six months before. The amount
paid for the option could be applied against the option exercise price
and equalled approximately fourteen per cent of such price. The
optionor placed his stock in escrow and executed proxies, irrevocable
until the option expired, in favor of the prospective purchaser. At
the request of the optionee, the optionor and his business associate
resigned from the board of directors of the corporation and were
replaced by representatives of the optionee.2 Contending that the
option was a sale within the meaning of section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and that such sale had occurred within six
months of the purchase of the stock by the insider, plaintiff brought
a shareholder derivative action to recover short-swing profits. Held:
An insider's sale of an option within six months of his purchase of the
underlying securities is a "sale" within the language of section 16(b)
if the parties so treat it. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1971) (No.
791).
Regarded by some as one of the most ambiguous provisions of all
the New Deal securities legislation, 3 section 16(b) represents part of
Congress's attempt in 1934, five years after "Black Friday," to curb
practices which had contributed to the collapse of the stock market
and precipitated the Great Depression. 4 The section is designed to
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

strued to cover any

transaction where

such beneficial owner was not such

both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of
the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within
the purchase of this subsection. Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48 Stat.
896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
2 The optionee, Smelting Refining and Mining Co., agreed to purchase 272,000
shares of the McDonough's stock in the Cudahy Company for $2,448,000. The
$350,000 option price was to be applied to the purchase price, but was to belong
to the McDonough's if Smelting failed to exercise its option to buy.
The transfer of stock to an escrow agent, the delivery of the irrevocable
proxies, and the resignation of the defendant-optionor and one of his associate
directors all occurred within two days of the execution of the option agreement.
Although these events occurred about four months after purchase of the underlying
shares by the insider, the option was not exercised until six months and one week
after the original purchase.
3

Comment, 64 MIcH. L. R-v.474 476 (1966) citing Halleran & Calderwood,

Effect of Federal Regulation on Distributionof and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO.
WAsir. L. Ruv. 86, 114 (1959).
4 ONeil, Extension of Liability Under Section 16(b)-A Whole New Can of
Worms, 11 Auz. L. Rxv. 309 (1969).
It is important to remember that both the hearings conducted by the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency and the subsequent passage of the Act took
place during a depression caused at least in part from stock manipulations by
insiders. Witness the following portion of the committee report to the Congress:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the
subconnittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by di(Continued on next page)
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deter 5 advantageous use of corporate information by those "insiders"
with greatest access to it-directors, officers, and beneficial owners of
more than ten per cent of any class or equity security of the corporation. For any purchase and sale or sale and purchase of stock in the
corporation by an insider within a six month period, recovery of all
profit realized is permitted, either by the corporation or a stockholder
suing in its behalf. Once those requirements are satisfied, liability
flows automatically, irrespective of intent or actual misuse of inside
information.6
Most of the section 16(b) litigation has been devoted to the
threshold issue of when the "crude rule of thumb"7 of absolute liability
will operate. While definitional problems have surrounded many of
the statutory terms,8 none have evoked as much litigation as have the
terms "purchase" and "sale." Providing only that the term "purchase"
include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire"9 and
that the term "sale" includes "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose
of"' 0 a security, the statutory definitions do not clearly cover or
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

rectors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and
the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid
them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was
the unscrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders
who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the
destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others. S. REP. No. 1455, 78d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934).
5The provisions of section 16(b) are remedial rather than penal. Yourd,
Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 183, 151 (1939). However, the section
takes on quasi-penal overtones because it imposes absolute liability without requiring motive, intent, knowledge or even misuse of inside information. Still the section
has been upheld under due process attack on the rationale that potential liability
flows from the voluntary assumption of insider status and its obligations and conditions. O'Neil, supra note 4, at 311.
6 As one of the draftsmen testified: "You hold the director, irrespective of any
intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will
be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation,
and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the
burden of having to prove that the director intended . . . to get out on a short
swing." Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on
S. Res. 84, 56, and 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 7266 (1934).
For a collection of other attempted defenses to have absolute liability of
section 16(b), all of which have failed, see Comment, 11 STAr. L. REv. 358, 359
n.12 (1959).
7 See note 6 supra.
8 See, e.g., Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur So., 202 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1953)
("equity security"); Colby v. Kiune, 178 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1949) ("officer");
Shreve, Beneficial Ownership of Securities Held by Family Members: 22 Bus.
LAWYER 431 (1967) ("beneficial ownership"); Comment, 22 Sw. L.J. 525 (1968)
("ten per cent owner").
948 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1964).
10 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1964).
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exempt many common transactions. For example, stock warrants, 1
options, 12 exchanges 13 and conversions'14 have al produced confusion
as to whether they constitute section 16(b) purchases or sales.
Grappling with the complex, dissimilar fact situations and lack of
help from the Supreme Court, several of the circuit courts of appeals

have tried with little success to formulate a test which can tell us
whether or not a given transaction is a purchase or sale within the
meaning of section 16(b). To this amorphous body of case law, the
Seventh Circuit now contributes Bershad, a case equitable in its result
but of limited value to those seeking a reliable test of which stock
options constitute section 16(b) sales.
The section 16(b) purchase and sale definitional problems were
first dealt with in the Second Circuit case of Park & Tilford, Incorporated v. Schulte,"5 where the court held that conversion of pre-

ferred shares to common stock constituted a "purchase" which could
be matched with a later sale of the common to permit recovery of
the shortswing profits. Although generally regarded as correct on
its facts,' 0 the option propounded what later proved too broad a rule:
We think a conversion of preferred into common stock followed
by a sale within six months is a 'purchase and sale' within the
statutory language of § 16(b). Whatever doubt might otherwise
exist as to whether a conversion is a 'purchase' is dispelled by
definition of 'purchase' to include 'any contract to buy, purchase,
or otherwise acquire.' . . . Defendants did not own the common
stock in question before they exercised their option to convert;
11
See Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950); Shaw v. Dreyfuss,
172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1949).
1-2 See Kornfeld v. Eaton, 327 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1964); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210
F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
13 See Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954); Blau v. Mission Corp.,
212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954).
14 Conversion by an insider of preferred stock or bonds into common stock of
the issuing corporation presents probably the most widely-litigated aspect of
definitional problems of purchase and sale which are associated with section 16(b).
For illustrative cases, see Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir.
1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 832 U.S. 761 (1947).
15 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
16 The defendants controlled the corporation and its decision to announce that
the preferred stock was to be redeemed after ninety days. About a month after
that announcement, defendants converted to common, the value of which soon
began a spectacular rise due to a rumor of a future dividend in kind (liquor).
Less than six months after conversion, defendants sold their common stock at handsome profits. The conversion from essentially unmarketable preferred to readily
marketable common provided the defendants with geat speculative abilities. See
Comment, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The Persistent Problems of
Purchase,Sale, and Debts Previously Contracted, 64 MicH. L. RPv. 474,478 (1966);
36 U. D-r. L. J. 343, 346 (1959).
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they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within the
meaning of the Act.17

Eleven years later, the Sixth Circuit in Ferraiolo v. Newman 8
was forced to modify the broad language of Park & Tilford. On facts
similar to Park & Tilford, the court held that the conversion of preferred to common was not a "purchase" because the preferred was
the "economic equivalent" of the common, giving the defendants
nothing which they had not already owned. 19 Moreover, reasoned the
court, the conversion was "in a very real sense involuntary," 20 because
the preferred was about to be called at nine dollars per share less
than the current market for the common, leaving defendant no
realistic choice but to exercise his conversion privilege before the
call. 21 Therefore, "defendant's conversion of Ashland preferred to
Ashland common had none of the economic indicia of a purchase; it
created no opportunity for profit which had not existed since 1948.
The transaction was not one that could have lent itself to the practices
which Section 16(b) was enacted to prevent."22 In contrast to the
"objective" view of Park & Tilford, eliminating any possibility of
discretionary administration of section 16(b),23 Ferraiolowas labeled
the "subjective" view which prevented calling the transaction a purchase or sale if it could not lend itself to the speculation encompassed

by section 16(b).
Subsequent to the Ferraiolo case, other courts of appeals amplified

the split in authority24 until 1966 when the Second Circuit rejected
17 Park & Tilford Inc. v.Schulte, 160 F.2d at 987.

18259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
19 Id. at 345.
20 Id.at 346.
21 The court noted that no inside information was necessary to compel the
conclusion that conversion was the proper course of action: the opportunity to do
so was given to all preferred shareholders and more than 99% of them converted.
259 F.2d at 345. On the other hand, Park & Tilford preferred stock was essentially
unmarketable, supra note 17, and shortswing speculation was possible only after
converting to common. For a full analysis of this and other distinctions between
Park & Tilford and Ferraiolo,see Comment. 107 U. PA. L. REv. 719, 722 (1959).
22 Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d at 346. This conclusion has been vigorously
criticized in Comment, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 719, 724-25 (1959), wherein the author
contends that whatever the equality of sneculative opuortunities between preferred
and common before the call of the preferred, defendant had to have common in
order to keep his speculative advantage; that although conversion will probably
proceed from legitimate motives, it is impossible to say that the conversion cannot
possiblu lend itself to insider speculation.
23 See Note, 49 IowA L. Rxv. 1346, 1350 (1964): Comment, 64 MicHr. L. REv.
474, 479 (1966): Comment, 11 STAr. L. REv. 358, 359 (1959).
24 Most notable was Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
which rejected outright the Ferrafolov. Newman approach on very similar facts and
foreclosed all inquiry into facts that might have indicated that it would have been
impossible for defendant to exploit inside knowledge. The holding showed a clear
preference for the Park & Tilford "objective' approach.
(Continued on next page)
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its former "objective" approach ("automatic" seems the better word)
in Blau v. Lamb. 25 Faced with another conversion question, the court
held that the crude rule of thumb could not be applied until it was
determined whether the transaction in question "could not possibly
serve as a vehicle for any of the abuses" 26 that section 16(b) was
designed to prevent..2 7 The Second Circuit's revised view has since
been adopted by the Eighth Circuit,28 and it seems well settled now
that a questionable transaction can be deemed a purchase or sale
only if it lends itself to the abuses that section 16(b) proscribes.
Against this background the Seventh Circuit was called upon in the
present case to decide whether the defendant-insider completed a
section 16(b) "sale" when he sold an option of his stock in the
corporation.
To help it decide whether the "option" was a "sale" within the
meaning of section 16(b), the court was confronted with circumstances
that simply compelled the conclusion that the transaction contained
possibilities for insider speculation. The $350,000 "binder" represented
over fourteen per cent of the purchase price of the stock and was to
be a retroactive down payment upon exercise of the option. Not
only did defendant deliver the stock endorsed in blank to an escrow
agent, he also executed irrevocable proxies in favor of the "optionee."
The defendant and one of his associates resigned from the board of
directors in favor of representatives of the "optionee." 29 On these
facts, the court held that the parties' treatment of the transaction
rendered it a "sale" which occurred "well in advance of the exercise
of the option";8 0 and the case stands for the proposition that under
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Sadly, the Third Circuit seems to have confused the "possibility of abuse" test
(Ferraiolo)with the "crude rule of thumb" (Park & Tilford. The former determines
only whether the transaction in question holds the possibility of unfair use of
inside information; if the answer is yes," then the latter is applied later in the
proceedings for the sole purpose of obviating the need to prove the insider's intent.
Comment, 64 Micn. L. 1Ev. 474, 490 (1966). See also W. PAINTER, FEDERAL
REGULATON OF INsmER TRADING 48 (1968), referring to the Heli-Coil opinion as
a "deliberate choice of the more conservative, if wooden, approach of the Park
& Tilford line of authority."
25 868 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 885 U.S. 1002 (1967).
20 Id.at 516.
27 The court was careful to make the distinction that the Third Circuit overlooked in Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, note 25 supra, which is that inquiry into
whether there has been insider abuse of information would be improper-rather,
the threshold issue of whether the transaction is a purchase or sale turns on whether
it could
2 8 lend itself to insider trading abuses. Id. at 516, 519.
See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 867 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
29 428 F.2d at 698.
80 The option agreement was executed and the other pertinent events all had
occurred by July 25, 1967. The option was formally exercised by the optionee on
(Continued on next page)
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these circumstances a sale has been made within the meaning of the
statute because the optionor had parted with so many of the attributes
of ownership that the transaction was tantamount to a sale. The case
is silent, however, as to which (if any) of the additional circumstances
must surround the option agreement to transform it into a section 16(b)
"sale." What result if defendant and his associate director had not
resigned? Would there still be a sale absent the escrow and proxy
arrangements? And what if the option binder price had not been
applied as retroactive down payment on the purchase price? Finally,
is the option agreement alone a section 16(b) sale?
Being a species of unilateral contract, 31 an option is logically a
.contract to buy" or a "contract to sell" within the statutory purchase
and sale definitions.3 2 But the logical analysis makes no judgments
and inquiry is necessary as to whether the option could lend itself
to insider trading abuses. An insider who buys an option has a right,
but no obligation, to buy, while one who sells an option has an
obligation to sell but no right to force the optionee to buy. Has a
purchase or sale occurred when rights or obligations, but not both,
have been determined? At least one court has said that both rights
and obligations must always be fixed in order for there to be a
purchase or sale because, until then, change occurs only at the
pleasure of the optionee.33 This begs the question when an insider
is the optionee because it is precisely his pleasure at whom section
16(b) is directed.3 4 The statement also appears to be incorrect when
the insider is an optionor, as was Mr. McDonough. The court in
Bershad observed:
The insider's sale of options in his stock is well adapted to speculation and abuse of inside information whether or not the option is
subsequently exercised. The sale of the right to purchase the
underlying
security is itself a means of realizing a profit from that
35
security.

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Sept. 27 1967. In order for section 16(b) liability to attach, the court had only
to find that the sale was completed prior to Sept. 15, 1967, since defendant had
purchased the stock in question on March 15, 1967. 428 F.2d at 698.
31

L. CoRBiN, ConBiN

ON

CoNRaAcTs § 260 (1952).

32 See note 9 and 10 supra, and accompanying text.
33 Sflverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
34 For a thorough analysis of this problem and a hypothetical fact situation
demonstrating the possibilities of abuse when the insider is the optionee, see
Michaely & Lee, Put and Call Options: CriteriaFor Applicability of Section 16(b)
of The SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 40 NoTmE DAME LAW. 239, 242-45 (1965).
35 428 F.2d at 698. Cf. Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965):
Options ... have lent themselves quite readily to the abuses uncovered
in the Congressional investigation antedating the Act, and in order to give
(Continued on next page)
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It is submitted that the above observation by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals should have been dispositive of the instant case.
This is the "possibility of abuse" threshold inquiry which now is
apparently agreed upon, ° and once the court finds such a possibility
of abuse, liability should be automatic. By resting its decision instead
on the several aggravating circumstances surrounding the option, this
court has transformed what would have been the heart of a milestone
decision into dictum. True, the tenor of the opinion suggests that
section 16(b) liability will attach to a simple option granted by an
insider, but such a holding has been reserved for future litigants.
Until this or some other court is willing to so hold, elaborate and
ingenious "option" agreements can be expected to continue in the
service of those who would avoid the "crude rule of thumb" of
section 16(b).
Steve Hixson
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

maximum support to the statute courts have attempted to include these
transactions by characterizing them as purchases or sales. 334 F.2d at 3.
a See note 28 supra, and accompanying text.

